Abstract Under "partial separation," it is increasingly common for a utility's upstream affiliate (e.g., an electric generation supplier) to be unregulated while its downstream affiliate (e.g., the distribution company offering retail service) is subject to regulation. When choosing the optimal form of downstream regulation, regulators may be confronted with the potential exercise of market power by the upstream affiliate. This paper finds that the imposition of a downstream price cap with an appropriate profit-sharing rate can eliminate the upstream affiliate's exercise of market power. However, it is less desirable to fully mitigate affiliate market power when upstream rivals also behave strategically.
Introduction
Currently, markets in electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, and transportation are subject to an environment where specific activities are subject to continuing regulation while other activities have been deregulated. In some cases, the regulated activity is "downstream" while the deregulated activity is "upstream." Moreover, it is not uncommon for some degree of vertical integration to remain.
The observed vertical integration may be an outcome of "partial unbundling" (also known as "partial separation") where former vertically integrated utilities J. D. Reitzes (B) The Brattle Group, 1850 M Street, NW, Suite 1200, Washington, DC 20036-5823, USA e-mail: james.reitzes@brattle.com have placed assets in unregulated affiliates as certain activities become deregulated. For example, many integrated electric utilities in the United States have been "separated" into a regulated distribution company that provides regulated retail electric service to residences and businesses, while electric generation assets have been placed in an unregulated affiliate. Both entities operate under the same corporate umbrella and are owned by the same shareholders.
As a result of partial separation, an unregulated upstream affiliate such as an electric generation company may be a significant participant in the market to supply inputs to its regulated downstream affiliate. For example, electric utilities in New Jersey hold an auction to acquire generation supplies for their retail electricity customers, and participants in this auction include unregulated generation affiliates of the utilities. The costs of purchasing power through these auctions are then passed directly into retail electric rates. 1 Utilities in Maryland, Illinois, and other states also have procured electric power for retail customers using auctions in which their unregulated generation affiliates participate. The intention in these states as well is to pass the auction-related power costs directly into retail rates. 2 In this setting, concerns have been raised before regulatory entities, including state public service commissions and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, that an unregulated upstream affiliate of a regulated utility may be able to exercise market power and boost regulated downstream prices when those prices reflect the supply costs facing the downstream entity. Although these market power concerns are genuine (particularly since an upstream affiliate may account for a sizeable share of the relevant upstream market), this paper shows that a policymaker can indirectly constrain an unregulated upstream affiliate's exercise of market power through the form of regulation applied to its downstream affiliate. Specifically, this can be accomplished through the use of a price cap, combined with an appropriately chosen rate of profit sharing between the regulated downstream firm and consumers. With an appropriately
